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Article
When Courts and Congress Don’t Say
What They Mean: Initial Reactions to
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and
to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
Richard Painter,∗ Douglas Dunham,∗∗ and Ellen
Quackenbos***
I. INTRODUCTION
People don’t always say exactly what they mean. Judges
and legislators are no exception. Judicial opinions sometimes
painstakingly interpret the language of a statute or articulate
some other legal rule and then summarize their holding in a
sentence or two, often preceded by language such as “We
therefore hold that . . . .” What follows this phrase may not
coincide precisely with what is said in the rest of the opinion,
even if the summary encompasses the particular facts of the
case. In subsequent cases with other facts, the difference
between those facts and the court’s summarizing language can
lead to litigation over what exactly the court meant.
Such is likely to happen with respect to Morrison v.
1
National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court’s most recent
opinions directed at extraterritorial enforcement of securities
laws. Throughout this opinion, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, defined the reach of the federal securities laws based
∗
Richard Painter, a law professor at the University of Minnesota, was the principal author
of an amicus brief filed by 21 law professors in Morrison v. National Australian Bank.
∗∗
Douglas Dunham, a lawyer at Skadden Arps, was one of the authors and counsel of
record for that amicus brief.
***
Ellen Quackenbos, also a lawyer at Skadden Arps, was one of the authors of the amicus
brief.
1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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on a single inquiry: whether the United States was the place of
the securities transaction. In summarizing the holding, Justice
Scalia wrote that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) Section 10(b) applies only to “transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
2
transactions in other securities.”
The problem with this summary is that the National
Australia Bank (NAB) securities at issue in the case were in
fact listed in the United States, which was required so NAB
could have American Depository Receipts (ADRs) trade in New
York. For the many issuers that list the same securities both
in the United States and in another country, the confusion
created by Justice Scalia’s summary of the holding could be
problematic. The Supreme Court almost certainly did not
intend to grant a right to sue in the United States when such
securities are bought outside the United States. Federal district
and appeals courts, however, will likely have to adjudicate the
claims of plaintiffs raising this very argument.
The Supreme Court is not alone in creating this confusion;
Congress has had its own drafting problems. In the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd3
Frank Act), Congress wanted to respond to Morrison by giving
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) power to pursue the type of fraud
alleged in Morrison—fraudulent conduct inside the United
States that affects securities transactions outside the United
States. The result would, in effect, reverse Morrison and make
4
United States securities laws apply. Congress drafted the
2. Id. at 2884; see also id. at 2886, 2888 (reiterating the reach of Section
10b).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929P(b) (2010)
4. Congress titled the section the “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the
Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws” and amended three
securities acts to add the following new subsection:
(c) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The jurisdiction of the district courts of
the United States and the United States courts of any Territory described
under subsection (a) includes violations of section 17(a), and all suits in equity
and actions at law under that section, involving—(1) conduct within the
United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation,
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and
involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the United
States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.
Id. § 929P(b) (amending The Securities Act of 1933.—Section 22 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77v(a)), The Securities Exchange Act of
1934.— Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78aa),
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Dodd-Frank Act provisions based on the assumption that the
question they were addressing was whether disputes involving
the application of securities laws transactions outside the
United States could be considered questions of subject matter
jurisdiction. For forty years before Morrison, various circuit
5
courts had analyzed the issue in just such a manner. The
Dodd-Frank Act provisions responded to Morrison by expressly
giving federal courts jurisdiction in certain circumstances over
SEC and DOJ suits concerning securities transactions outside
6
the United States.
The problem with the Dodd-Frank Act provisions is that
the Supreme Court in Morrison had already decided that under
7
existing law federal courts had jurisdiction over these cases.
Rather, the Supreme Court held that securities transactions
outside the United States were not covered by the language of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, a question of the merits.
Indeed, several months before, in late 2009, the Supreme Court
in Union Pacific Railroad v. Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen
General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region clarified its
position that anything that does not go to the power of the
courts to hear a case is a question of the merits and not of
8
jurisdiction. As long ago as 1959, in Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., the Supreme Court had approached
9
Furthermore, in
extraterritoriality as a merits question.
October 2009, the Solicitor General and the SEC, in their brief
opposing the certiorari petition in Morrison, recognized that the
10
extraterritorial question was not jurisdictional. Combined,
and The Investment Advisers Act of 1940.—Section 214 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b–14)).
5. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir.),
modified on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1968); In re CP
Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009); Cont’l Grain
(Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979).
6. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 929P(b) (2010).
7. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
8. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region, 130 S. Ct. 584,
598–99 (2009).
9. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359, 381–84
(1959), cited in Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
10. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) (“If a particular
suit is otherwise an appropriate means of enforcing a ‘liability or duty created
by’ the Exchange Act or rules promulgated thereunder by the Commission,
Section 78aa unambiguously vests the district courts with jurisdiction to
resolve it.”). See id. (“Thus, under the plain terms of Section 78aa, the
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these developments make it all the more puzzling that
Congress still approached extraterritoriality as a question of
jurisdiction when drafting the Dodd-Frank Act.
While the Congress’s intent in passing the Dodd-Frank Act
seems directed at empowering the SEC and DOJ to combat
securities fraud, one can credibly argue that they failed to do
11
so. The Dodd-Frank Act provisions merely restated what
Morrison had already clearly stated: specifically, that federal
courts had jurisdiction in these types of cases. Because the
Dodd-Frank Act only approached the question of jurisdiction,
and did not address the substantive reach of Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, Congress arguably left the SEC and DOJ
with no more power than they had the day Morrison was
decided.
Many lower court judges are not eager to frustrate the
intent of Congress, and Congress obviously intended the DoddFrank Act to empower the SEC and DOJ to pursue
transnational securities fraud.
Other judges might say,
however, that the intent of Congress is in the language of the
12
statute, and nothing more. If the statute is worded so as to be
meaningless, so be it. The Supreme Court also has rarely been
shy of highlighting when Congress fails to draft a statute that
13
reflects its true intentions. It is possible that before a case
reaches the Supreme Court, Congress will change the
geography of an alleged fraudulent scheme—i.e., whether it was conceived and
executed in whole or in part outside the United States—is irrelevant to the
district court's subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
11. Indeed, the day the President signed the Dodd-Frank Act, George
Conway, the lawyer who argued and won the Morrison case for NAB,
published a memo to his firm’s clients stating that Congress’s Dodd-Frank Act
provisions may have done nothing meaningful at all. See George T. Conway
III, Extraterritoriality of the Federal Securities Laws After Dodd-Frank: Partly
Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged,
LIPTON,
ROSE
&
KATZ
(June
21,
2010),
WACHTELL,
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.17763
.10.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Mwasaru v. Napolitano, 2010 WL 3419458, at *4 (6th Cir.
Sept. 1, 2010) (“[L]egislative intent should be divined first and foremost from
the plain language of the statute. If the text of the statute may be read
unambiguously and reasonably, our inquiry is at an end.”) (citation omitted).
13. See, e.g., Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 157–58 (1991) (rejecting
what Congress may have intended and explaining “[t]he fact that Congress
may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not
a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning”) (citation
omitted); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 164 (1991) (noting that "it makes no
difference whether the legislative history affirmatively reflects" a certain
intent, if "the plain language of the statute" is to the contrary).
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legislative language and directly address the substantive reach
of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. If not, sooner or later,
there will be a litigant who chooses to challenge a SEC or DOJ
suit and run the risk of losing on the basis that Congress did
not empower the SEC or DOJ to bring the suit. The litigant
would argue that Congress may have meant to create a cause of
action for the SEC and DOJ, but did not do so.
The first part of this article will address whether there are
any logical exceptions that can be found to the Supreme Court’s
limitation of the federal securities laws to transactions taking
place within the United States. This article concludes that the
answer to this question is no. The second part of this article
will address whether the confusion arising out of Congress’
language choices in the Dodd-Frank Act is such as to merit
amendment to the statute. This article concludes that, while
the statutory language probably gives the SEC the authority
that Congress intended, the statute should still be amended.
II. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
In late June 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank that securities fraud suits could not
be brought under U.S. law against foreign defendants by
foreign plaintiffs who bought their securities outside the United
14
States (“f-cubed” securities litigation). In Morrison, Australian
plaintiffs attempted to pursue claims under U.S. federal
securities law after purchasing shares of an Australian bank on
the Australia stock exchange and claiming they had been
misled in Australia by statements by Australian bank officials
15
regarding the performance of a U.S. subsidiary. The Supreme
Court rejected alleged fraudulent concealment of bad mortgage
loans in a U.S. subsidiary as sufficient justification to apply
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act extraterritorially to
16
transactions on the Australian stock exchange.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not apply
17
extraterritorially, and that “the focus of the Exchange Act is
not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon

14.
15.
16.
17.

See Morrison 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
See id. at 2875–76.
See id. at 2883–84.
See id. at 2883.
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purchases and sales of securities in the United States.” Thus,
the Supreme Court rejected the proposal of the Solicitor
General and the SEC to apply the Exchange Act to fraud in
extraterritorial securities transactions that “[involve]
significant conduct in the United States that is material to the
19
fraud’s success.” The Supreme Court concluded that Section
10(b) reaches only fraud in connection with the “purchase or
sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the
20
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”
In February 2010, twenty-one law professors from around
the country filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in
21
Morrison. The brief urged the Supreme Court to establish a
bright line rule limiting the application of the federal securities
22
fraud statute to securities bought or sold in the United States.
The law professors’ position was that the place of the
transaction is the determining factor for deciding whether
23
Section 10(b) applies.
The fundamental premise of both the amicus brief and the
Supreme Court’s holding is that U.S. securities laws were
24
intended to protect U.S. markets. Congress has enacted
specific provisions that allow the SEC to pursue conduct in
foreign markets in particular situations that affect the
securities of U. S. issuers or where conduct abroad is intended
25
to evade the purposes of U.S. securities laws. Otherwise, U.S.
26
securities laws do not apply to securities traded abroad.
III. DUAL LISTED SECURITIES AFTER THE
MORRISON OPINION
Despite the bright line test adopted in Morrison, some open
18. Id. at 2884.
19. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886–88 (2010).
20. Id. at 2888.
21. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents,
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191),
2010 WL 740747 [hereinafter Law Professors Amicus Br.].
22. See id. at 2. (arguing that such a bright line rule aligns with the
legislative history and congress’s original intent to cover only those foreign
securities traded within the United States).
23. See id. at 6, 31.
24. See id. at 14–18; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–85 (2010).
25. See Law Professors Amicus Br., supra note 21 at 19–20 (describing the
purpose of Section 30 of the Exchange Act).
26. See id.
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issues remain. In the vast majority of instances, the “location of
transaction” test is a clear test; some issues linger, however,
because the test remains ambiguous in a small but significant
number of transactions. Transactions on a securities exchange
are usually easy to place in a particular location—the location
of the exchange. It is irrelevant whether the investor resides in
27
the United States or abroad. In addition, the vast majority of
over-the-counter transactions also occur in one country or
another. However, situations occur where the location of the
transaction is ambiguous. This happens particularly in two
instances. The first instance is where the transaction is in one
country and a broker-dealer or other intermediary is in
another. The second is in private transactions—particularly in
derivative securities and similar instruments—implemented
through steps taken both inside and outside the United States.
In these two instances the application of Morrison may be
28
unclear. This article does not address these situations, but it
is predictable that there will be a significant amount of postMorrison litigation over which transactions take place inside
the United States and which do not. Rather, this article
addresses the impact of the Morrison decision on a small subset
of securities transactions taking place outside the United
States—transactions in securities that are also listed on a
United States securities exchange.
27. This issue has already come up in at least two cases involving “fsquared securities litigation” (investors inside the United States who purchase
securities outside the United States and then sue foreign defendants outside
the United States). In Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., No. 08 Civ. 3758 (VM),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76543 (S.D.N.Y July 27, 2010), plaintiffs argued that
because they resided in the United States their transactions on foreign
markets should be deemed to take place inside the United States. Judge
Marrero rejected this claim and granted summary judgment to the
defendants: “In Morrison the Supreme Court roundly (and derisively) buried
the venerable ‘conduct or effect’ test . . . . Yet here, Lead Plaintiffs seek to
exhume and revive the body.” Id. at *6. In another case, plaintiffs representing
U.S. investors who purchased shares in Toyota outside the United States
claimed that the Court’s holding in Morrison allows their claims to be brought
under Section 10(b) because the investors’ location determines the location of
their transactions. The district court, however, rejected this argument at least
for purposes of designating a lead plaintiff in the litigation, and it appears
likely that courts will continue to reject the argument. See Stackhouse v.
Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. 2010).
28. See In re Banco Santander Sec.—Optimal Litig., No. 1:09-cv-20215PCH, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2010) (dismissing complaint of foreign
purchasers in foreign fund that invested in Bernie Madoff’s funds who argued
that they should be able to sue Banco Santander S.A. and other foreign
companies in the United States).
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A. APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 10(b)(5) AFTER MORRISON
The most problematic phrases in the entire Morrison
opinion appear in two places. First, there is a summary of the
holding which states: “And it is in our view only transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
29
transactions in other securities, to which §10(b) applies.”
Second, at the end of the opinion, there is similar language:
“Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the
30
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”
Looking at these two sentences alone, the unanswered question
is whether, for a security listed on a domestic exchange, the
transaction in that security also has to take place on that
domestic exchange or elsewhere in the United States. As
explained more fully below, the answer to this question is
almost certainly “yes” in view of what is said in the rest of the
opinion, but these two sentences—if read in isolation—appear
31
to leave that question ambiguous.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are already using these sentences to
29. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
30. Id. at 2888. Justice Scalia probably used the summarizing language
he did because the language in the Exchange Act reads: “the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). This sentence—which in essence means
“any security”—was meant to ensure that the Securities Exchange Act, which
was designed primarily to regulate U.S. exchanges, would not be avoided by
people who trade securities off the exchanges. There is no distinction made in
this part of the Exchange Act, however, between securities registered on
national securities exchanges and those not so registered; indeed the express
language states that they shall be treated the same. Id. The Morrison holding
is that this Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act only applies to transactions in
the United States. In other words, Section 10(b) applies to the purchase or sale
of a security registered on a national securities exchange or any other security
in the United States.
31. The Court in Morrison refers to “securities not registered on domestic
exchanges” and goes on to say that with respect to such securities the foreign
location of the transaction precludes the Exchange Act’s applicability absent
regulations from the SEC in the narrow circumstances permitted under
Section 30 of the Exchange Act. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885. Securities that
are registered on domestic exchanges are discussed as follows: “And it is in our
view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and
domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.” Id. at 2884.
The very same paragraph, however, begins with the following sentence:
“Applying the same mode of analysis here, we think that the focus of the
Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon
purchases and sales of securities in the United States.” Id.
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argue that even if the overwhelming majority of an issuer’s
shares are traded outside the United States, as long as the
issuer’s shares are listed on a domestic U.S. exchange,
transactions of all of the issuer’s shares are covered by Section
32
10(b)(5). It does not matter that the transactions take place on
a foreign exchange.
Many Canadian companies, for example, have one class of
common shares that trades on both the Toronto exchange and
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In other words, you
could buy the shares on the NYSE and then sell the very same
shares in Toronto, and vice versa. So with respect to such
companies, applying the language of Morrison literally, Section
10(b) would apply to a purchase of securities in Canada on the
Toronto exchange by a Canadian citizen, simply because the
shares are also listed on the NYSE. This interpretation is
inconsistent with what is said in the rest of the opinion, but it
33
appears to be literally what is said in the Morrison opinion.
The opinion adds confusion when it tries to distinguish the
34
facts of Morrison from Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.
Schoenbaum involved Section 10(b) claims by an American
shareholder of a Canadian company (Banff) based upon sales in
Canada by the company of its treasury shares to affiliated
corporations at a price that the corporations allegedly knew
35
was less than the true value of the shares. Banff’s common
stock was registered with the SEC and traded on both the
36
American Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange.
According to the Supreme Court in Morrison, the treasury
shares at issue in Schoenbaum were not listed on the American
37
Stock Exchange. However, as the Second Circuit’s opinion in
Schoenbaum made clear, the Banff treasury shares were shares
38
of the company’s common stock. Indeed, the fact that the
challenged transactions in Schoenbaum “involve[d] stock
registered and listed on a national securities exchange,” and
39
thus directly affected the interests of American investors, was
32. See Pls.’ Supp. Mem. Concerning the Impact of Morrison v. NAB at
10–16, in In Re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y.
July 16, 2010).
33. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884, 2888.
34. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 200.
35. Id. at 204.
36. Id.
37. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.
38. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 205.
39. Id. at 208; see also id. at 206 (holding that Congress intended the
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key to the Second Circuit’s determination that Section 10(b)
applied.
The Morrison opinion disapproves of Schoenbaum, its
40
analysis, and the result reached therein. The Supreme Court’s
express (if incorrect) statement that the transactions in
Morrison did not involve stock listed on an American
41
exchange, however, combined with its statement that Rule
10b-5 applies to “transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges,” may be argued to leave some ambiguity as to the
applicability of Section 10(b) to transactions that take place
42
abroad in stock of a class also listed on an American exchange.
Nevertheless, a reading of the entire Morrison opinion
supports the view that the Supreme Court did not mean to
extend the reach of Section 10(b) to foreign transactions in
securities “listed on an American exchange.” The Supreme
Court’s unequivocal holding is that Section 10(b) does not apply
43
“extraterritorially.” It would drive an extremely large hole
into that holding if the mere listing of a stock on an American
exchange were enough to alter the extraterritoriality of a
foreign purchase of the stock on a foreign exchange, as there
are well over 400 foreign issuers that list their shares on both a
44
foreign exchange and a U.S. exchange.
Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes the
“focus” of American securities laws on “domestic transactions”
and on “purchases and sales of securities in the United
45
States.” Thus, the court’s emphasis on “transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges” is intended to define
what conduct must be evaluated to assess “where a putative

Exchange Act to be extraterritorial in order to protect American investors
“who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges.”).
40. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–81.
41. See id. at 2888 ("This case involves no securities listed on a domestic
exchange . . . .").
42. See id. at 2874; see also id. at 2881 (explaining that 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 is “promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act”);
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (prohibiting fraudulent use of national securities
exchanges).
43. Id. at 2883 ("In short, there is no affirmative indication in the
Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude
that it does not.").
44. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FOREIGN
COMPANIES REGISTERED AND REPORTING WITH THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2009).
45. See Morrison, 130 U.S. at 2874.
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46

violation occurs.” That is, the location of the transaction (and
not the location of allegedly fraudulent conduct) determines
whether the application of Section 10(b) would be
extraterritorial and thus impermissible, or domestic and thus
within the intended scope of the statute. The Supreme Court’s
language is not intended, however, to extend the application of
Section 10(b) to transactions on foreign exchanges.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court was well aware that
NAB had ADRs listed in New York and that Section 10(b) does
apparently apply to ADRs (which were not an issue in the
47
case). In order for a foreign issuer to sponsor and list ADRs on
a U.S. exchange, it must register the underlying, deposited
shares with the SEC and, at least for the NYSE, actually list
48
the underlying shares (though not for trading). NAB’s
registration statements in the United States, for example,
49
pertained to the “ordinary shares.” The Supreme Court
nonetheless held that Section 10(b) did not apply to NAB’s
50
This holding is
ordinary shares traded in Australia.
inconsistent with a theory that the Court would apply Section
10(b) to any security listed on a U.S. exchange even if the
transaction in that security is outside the United States.
Many companies have ADRs trading in the United States.
It cannot possibly be the case that the Supreme Court intended
Section 10(b) to apply not only to the ADR itself but also to a
foreign purchase of the underlying stock on a foreign exchange
simply because the underlying shares are registered in the
United States to enable the company to issue the ADR.
Otherwise, Section 10(b) after Morrison would have a broader

46. See id. at 2884, n.9.
47. See id. at 2875, 2876 n.1 (explaining that NAB had ADR’s trading in
NewYork, but the ADR holders’ claims were dismissed in district court. NAB
had not disputed that investors who purchased its ADRs in the United States
would be covered by U.S. securities laws.).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2006).
49. Page 58 of the Supplemental Joint Appendix in Morrison v. NAB, the
20-F cover says that NAB’s ordinary shares were “registered” on the “NYSE.”
Supp. Joint App. at 58 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869
(2010). This cover looks exactly like the 20-F cover for Vivendi that the
plaintiffs there are relying on. The registration regulation is cited in the
Vivendi plaintiffs’ brief. See Plaintiffs' Supp. Mem. Concerning the Impact of
Morrison v. NAB at 11, in In re Vivendi Universal , S.A., Sec. Litig., No. 02
Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2010) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d1-1).
50. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876–77 (affirming the District Court’s
ruling); see also In Re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94162, at 15-16. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
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extraterritorial reach than ever before, the exact opposite of
what the Supreme Court clearly intended. Such a reading of
Morrison is illogical and is also contrary to the result in the
case. It also makes little sense to argue that the result would be
different, and Section 10(b) would apply to transactions in
NAB’s ordinary shares outside the United States, if NAB had
listed its ordinary shares for trading on the NYSE instead of
listing the ADRs. There is little substantive difference between
51
these two types of arrangements.
B. SECTION 30 OF THE EXCHANGE ACT
Congress specifically addressed the extraterritorial reach
52
of the Exchange act in Section 30. The Morrison opinion
observed that Congress specifically addressed in Section 30
those situations where the SEC needs to protect investors in
the United States against violations of the Exchange Act in
foreign trading markets. The Morrison opinion also makes it
clear that Congress did not intend the extraterritorial effect of
the Exchange Act to go beyond the specific provisions of Section
30, which is Congress’s only articulation of the extraterritorial
reach of Section 10(b). The Supreme Court explained that
Section 30(b) “seems to us to be directed at actions abroad that
might conceal a domestic violation, or might cause what would

51. As the Supreme Court explained in Morrison, an NAB ADR
"represent[s] the right to receive a specified number of [NAB's] ordinary
shares," and thus is functionally equivalent to a purchase of the stock itself.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.
52. Section 30 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to make
use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for
the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction in any security the issuer of
which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or has its principal
place of business in, a place within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors or to prevent the evasion of this title.
(b) The provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without
the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a)-(b) (2010).
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otherwise be a domestic violation to escape on a technicality.”
The only situation where Section 30(b) contemplates the
applicability of the Exchange Act to transactions outside the
United States is when a transaction contravenes rules or
regulations prescribed by the SEC to prevent evasion of the
54
Act. However, the SEC has not identified specific situations in
which transactions in securities outside the United States are
deemed as evasion of the Exchange Act simply because the
same securities are also listed in the United States. As a result,
the SEC has not promulgated any rules to address such a
problem. Therefore, the mere fact that a security is listed in the
United States, as well as abroad, does not automatically make
transactions in that security outside the United States as
evasion of the Exchange Act.
Likewise, Section 30(a) reinforced the Supreme Court’s
extraterritoriality analysis that “[i]ts explicit provision for a
specific extraterritorial application would be quite superfluous
if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transactions
on foreign exchanges—and its limitation of that application to
55
securities of domestic issuers would be inoperative.” The nonU.S. issuer is beyond the scope of Section 30(a) insofar as the
56
transaction occurs in a foreign market. It does not matter that
the issuer—like NAB—has securities listed in the United
States. Congress could have extended the coverage of Section
30(a) to all securities with dual listings by including in Section
30(a) the clause “non-U.S. issuers that have securities listed in
the United States” in the statute. If Congress had done so,
Section 30(a) would have applied to brokers or dealers in
connection with such securities wherever the securities are
traded. Congress, however, did not do so and explicitly limited
Section 30(a) to transactions of securities by U.S. issuers.
As suggested in the law professors’ amicus brief, the
Supreme Court should avoid confusion over this issue by
holding that Section 10(b) applies only to securities bought or
57
sold in the United States. This is likely the Supreme Court’s
53. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882–83.
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2006).
55. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2006) (applying only to transaction in
securities that "the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the
laws of, or has its principal place of business in, a place within or subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States....").
57. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 31.
The brief urges the Court to uphold the original intent of the Congress until
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intent in Morrison when the Court referred to “transactions in
58
securities listed on domestic exchanges.” The phrase likely
included all transactions on those exchanges, not merely the
listing of the securities on those exchanges. The entirety of the
opinion—in particular the emphasis on the location of the
securities transaction throughout the opinion—supports this
59
Furthermore, the two strongest policy
interpretation.
arguments supporting the Morrison opinion—applying Section
10(b) to foreign exchanges would (i) interfere with the laws of
other countries and (ii) turn the U.S. into a Shangri-La for
plaintiffs’ lawyers suing on behalf of investors who purchased
their shares on foreign exchanges—would be undermined by
allowing worldwide class actions under U.S. securities laws
against dual listed companies. In sum, it is clear that plaintiffs
who made transactions of securities outside the United States
do not have a cause of action under Section 10(b) just because
these securities are listed on a U.S. securities exchange.
IV. THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Congress quickly responded to Morrison—language on
extraterritoriality in the Dodd-Frank Act is based on proposals
60
made before the Morrison case was even decided. Many
the legislature takes further action.
58. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (“And it is in our view only transactions
in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”).
59. Id. at 2882 ("Nothing suggests that this national public interest
[described in 15 U.S.C. § 78b] pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign
exchanges and markets.") (emphasis in original); id. at 2883 (explaining that §
30(a)'s "explicit provision for a specific extraterritorial application would be
quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to
transactions on foreign exchanges—and its limitation of that application to
securities of domestic issuers would be inoperative."); id. at 2884 ("[T]he focus
of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but
upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States."); id. ("The
primacy of the domestic exchange is suggested by the very prologue of the
Exchange Act . . . "); id. at 2885 (Stating that under § 30(a) & (b), "it is the
foreign location of the transaction that establishes (or reflects the presumption
of) the Act's inapplicability, absent regulations by the Commission.");
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (noting the "same focus on domestic transactions"
in the Securities Act of 1933); id. ("Like the United States, foreign countries
regulate their domestic securities exchanges and securities transaction
occurring within their territorial jurisdiction.").
60. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010). The House version of the bill,
however, was enacted after the United States submitted its brief of October
2009 opposing the cert petition in Morrison. This brief expressly acknowledged
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observers predicted that the Court in Morrison would bar fcubed securities cases and that the SEC wanted Congress to be
61
prepared. Some members of Congress wanted to expand the
private right of action to cover such cases, and others are
62
content to simply give enforcement powers to the SEC.
Section 7216 of the Dodd-Frank Act was originally drafted
to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction with respect to antifraud
provisions in the federal securities laws if there is ‘conduct
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction
occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
63
investors.’ The proposed language covered Section 22 of the
64
65
Securities Act of 1933, Section 27 of the Exchange Act and
66
Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
The SEC favored a similar provision, but one limited to
extending jurisdiction of U.S. courts to cases brought by the
SEC. The language that was ultimately written into the DoddFrank Act was apparently drafted by the SEC and was
substantially similar to the earlier language of the act with the
notable exception that coverage was limited to actions brought
by the SEC or by the United States (the latter presumably
67
being criminal cases).
In all of these proposals, the legislative language was
worded in terms of the federal courts’ subject matter
68
jurisdiction. The focus on jurisdiction is surprising because
briefs in the Morrison case were already approaching this issue
69
on the merits of Section 10(b). Nonetheless, Congress, as well
that the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) was not a question of
jurisdiction. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6.
61. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at
30–31 (citing H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010)). The brief speculated several
alternatives in which Congress may limit jurisdictions in deference to SEC.
62. See id. at 31.
63. Id. at 30.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (2006).
67. Compare H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7216 (2009), with H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. § 929P (2010). The earlier bill did not specify who can bring the action.
The later bill only allows the courts to have jurisdiction over an action or
proceeding brought by or instituted by the Commission or the United States.
68. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7216. “The district courts of the United
States and the United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of
an action or proceeding . . . .”
69. See generally Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 2-5 Morrison v.
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as the Second Circuit, approached the issue in Morrison as one
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, before Morrison was decided, the Supreme
Court ruled on Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers in
70
late 2009. In Union Pacific, the Supreme Court held that
Congress alone controls the jurisdictional reach of a statute,
that jurisdiction is distinct from issues pertaining to the merits
of a case, and that courts may not refuse to exercise jurisdiction
71
based on their belief that no claim exists on the merits. The
Court’s holding should not have been a surprise because the
Court’s opinion in Union Pacific relied heavily on the Court’s
prior holdings and other cases in which the same term was
72
applied in a similar rule.
Under the reasoning of Union Pacific, the scope of Section
10(b) is a question of merit, not a question of subject matter
jurisdiction. Therefore, the federal courts have jurisdiction over
cases brought under Section 10(b) including f-cubed cases. The
question should be whether there is a cause of action under
Section 10(b). The petitioners in Morrison, apparently realizing
that they were very likely to lose the case and having second
thoughts about taking it to the Supreme Court, mentioned
asking the Court to remand the case to the Second Circuit for
reconsideration as an issue of merit rather than an issue of
73
jurisdiction in view of Union Pacific. The Supreme Court
denied this motion and made a ruling based on the merit of the
same issue that the parties had characterized as jurisdictional
74
in the Second Circuit and in the cert petition.
NAB, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (discussing and citing cases). This concept was
not new and goes back to Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946).
70. Union Pacific R. Co., 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009).
71. Id. at 590, 596–99.
72. Id. at 596–97 (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006);
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004)); see also United States v. Denedo, 129
S. Ct. 2213 (2009) (holding that absent constitutional constraints, Congress
decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider, and that it
is erroneous to conflate jurisdiction with the merits); United Student Aid
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010) (holding that bankruptcy
court's discharge of student loan without making finding of hardship, although
erroneous, was not beyond court's jurisdiction); Arthur Andersen LLP v.
Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009) (holding that courts declined jurisdictions
erred in "conflating the jurisdictional question with the merits").
73. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
74. Id.
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The Second Circuit in Morrison thus had erroneously
considered the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) to raise a
question of subject matter jurisdiction, affirming the District
Court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
75
12(b)(1). In view of Union Pacific, the case should have been
decided on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6). As Justice Scalia
observed in Morrison:
[T]o ask what conduct §10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct §10(b)
prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by
contrast, “refers to a tribunal’s ‘“power to hear a case.’” Union Pacific
R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of
Adjustment, Central Region, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 12)
(quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006), in turn
quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002)). It
presents an issue quite separate from the question whether the
allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief. See Bell v. Hood,
327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946). The District Court here had jurisdiction
under 15 U. S. C. §78aa to adjudicate the question whether §10(b)
76
applies to National’s conduct.

The plaintiffs had asked for a remand to the Second Circuit
in view of this error, but the Supreme Court refused and
77
decided the case on the merits. Justice Scalia’s opinion went
on to hold that, even though the federal courts had subject
matter jurisdiction, there was no cause of action on the merits
78
where the securities were not purchased in the United States.
The complaint was to be dismissed on the merits under Rule
79
12(b)(6).
The difficulty is that nobody changed the language in the
extraterritoriality provisions pending in Congress. The
language was not changed even though the House passed the
original bill in December 2009, a month and a half after the
SEC and the Solicitor General told the Court this wasn’t a
80
question of jurisdiction. The proposed legislative language
75. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d
Cir. 2008).
76. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
77. See id. In denying Morrison’s request for a remand, the Court stated
that because “nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on the
mistake, a remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same
Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion.” Id.
78. Id. at 2888.
79. Id. at 2877.
80. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Ltd. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) at 16 (arguing that in an enforcement
action brought by the Commission, the “transnational character of the
fraudulent scheme is relevant only to the question whether defendants’
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continued to approach the question of extraterritoriality as one
of subject matter jurisdiction rather than the merits under
Section 10(b). The language ultimately adopted in Dodd-Frank
in Section 929P of the Act is under the heading
“Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Antifraud Provisions of the
Federal Securities Laws,” and reads:
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78aa) is amended—
.....
by adding at the end the following new subsection:
‘‘(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district
courts of the United States and the United States courts of any
Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding
brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States
alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this title
involving—
‘‘(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and
involves only foreign investors; or
‘‘(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
81
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.’’
The Dodd-Frank Act contains similar provisions with
respect to Section 17A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section
82
214 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.
conduct violated Section 10(b).”) The court already has jurisdiction under the
“plain terms” of the statutory provisions that govern SEC enforcement suits.
Id. Thus, Congress already decided that jurisdiction was proper, so the courts
need not to.
81. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 929P(b)(2).
82. Id. § 929P(b)(1) & (3). Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act also
provides that the SEC shall solicit public comment and then conduct a study
to determine the extent to which private rights of action under the antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act should be extended to cover the same conduct
with respect to which actions brought by the SEC and the United States are
authorized under Section 929P of the Act. The study:
shall consider and analyze, among other things—
(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it should
extend to all private actors or whether it should be more limited to extend just
to institutional investors or otherwise;
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on
international comity;
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of action for
transnational securities frauds; and
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be adopted. Id. §
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Some lawyers defending against SEC suits under these
provisions may argue that they do not affect the Court’s
holdings in Morrison as to what transactions fall within Section
10(b) because these provisions merely give federal courts
jurisdiction that the Morrison opinion recognized courts
already have. Because the Dodd-Frank Act language does not
speak to the merits, e.g. the substantive reach of Section 10(b),
Congress has not changed the Court’s holding with respect to
actions brought by the SEC or the United States. The DoddFrank Act’s extraterritoriality provision thus does absolutely
nothing other than affirm the opinion in Union Pacific,
reiterated in Morrison, that this is not a question of subject
matter jurisdiction because the courts have jurisdiction.
Such a literal reading of the Dodd-Frank Act clearly does
not reflect the intent of Congress. The problem is that the SEC
still might not fare well before some lower court judges who do
not care about the intent of Congress when Congress fails to
clearly express that intent. If the Dodd-Frank Act does not
explicitly address the merits of an SEC claim under Section
10(b), and only speaks to jurisdiction, some courts may not be
willing to read into the provision what Congress clearly
intended: to empower the SEC to bring cases where the conduct
was that described in the statute.
Lower courts, particularly most courts of appeals, probably
would not be willing to deviate from the plain language of the
Act without a credible alternative explanation for what
Congress intended to do in these provisions other than
empower the SEC and DOJ to bring such suits. Most judges
will not be willing to tell Congress that, because of the way a
statute is worded, it fails to accomplish anything at all. On the
other hand, Congress enacts statutes; it does not enact “intent.”
In this instance, reconstructing what Congress intended
involves construing every single enforceable substantive
provision of three complex statutes as having been amended to
929Y(b)(1) — (4).
The provision requires that a report of the study be submitted and
recommendations made to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House
within 18 months. Id. § 929Y(c). For a number of reasons expressed in the
professors’ amicus brief in Morrison, such a private right of action is very
worrisome from a policy perspective. See Law Professors' Am. Br. at 28–29. We
do not address that issue here.
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incorporate the conduct and effects tests used in the courts of
appeals prior to Morrison if an action is brought by the SEC or
DOJ. Some judges may say that amending the substantive
provisions of these statutes is Congress’s job, not theirs.
Congress merely telling the courts what they already knew,
that the courts have jurisdiction, is not enough. The Supreme
Court in particular has frequently sent Congress back to the
legislative drawing board and might do so here.
This article does not attempt to predict what will happen if
Congress does not change the statute before the issue reaches
the Supreme Court. In the meantime, however, the line of
defense articulated by Conway has merit and could pose a
preliminary obstacle to the SEC in some of the enforcement
actions it brings under these provisions of the Dodd-Frank
83
Act.
Despite Conway’s argument that the statute does not, in
fact, have extraterritorial applications due to an apparent
drafting error, the SEC has several arguments in its favor.
First, as pointed out above, is the seemingly obvious intent of
Congress. There is no alternative explanation for what
Congress intended to do in these provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act. Congress wanted the SEC and DOJ to be able to bring
suits in certain circumstances and described those
circumstances in Dodd-Frank. Congress could not possibly have
intended only to give federal courts jurisdiction over SEC and
DOJ cases simply for the purpose of dismissing those cases on
the merits. Congress intended to change the law (or at least
84
change judicial interpretation of prior law).
83. See Conway, supra note 10, at 1 (arguing that Section 929P(b) does
“not expand the geographic scope of any substantive regulatory provision,” as
the provision purports to do. Rather, the provision only addresses the
“jurisdiction” of the district courts “to hear cases involving extraterritorial
elements.”).
84. Even if the statutory language in Dodd-Frank only expressly grants
courts jurisdiction they already have, there remains the question of whether
courts should interpret Section 10(b) differently in view of this new statute.
The SEC could successfully argue that because of the Dodd-Frank provisions
the holding in Morrison has to be modified for DOJ and SEC actions. The
Supreme Court applied the extraterritoriality presumption in Morrison
because the Court saw no indicia whatsoever that Congress intended Section
10(b) to apply to transactions outside the United States. Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
at 2883 ("In short, there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that
10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.").
But when Congress added the extraterritorial text in the jurisdiction provision
in Dodd-Frank, Congress gave affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that
the antifraud provisions of the Act apply extraterritorially. Congress thus

PAINTER Formatted - CDL

2011]

11/29/2010 9:27 AM

MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIAN BANK

21

Second, there is a reason for the confusion on this issue
because, up until Union Pacific in late 2009, courts of appeals
had—however incorrectly—approached these questions as
85
grounded in subject matter jurisdiction. Congress used the
framework that most courts had used for a long time to address
86
this issue—the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).
Congress adopted this framework despite the Supreme Court’s
finding in Union Pacific that the courts of appeals incorrectly
applied subject-matter jurisdiction analysis. Thus, Congress’s
final language might reflect a difficult point of law, on which
the courts have reached contrary conclusions. Congress adopted
this framework despite the Supreme Court’s finding in Union
Pacific that the courts of appeals incorrectly applied subjectmatter jurisdiction analysis. Thus, Congress’s final language
might reflect a difficult point of law, on which the courts have
reached contrary conclusions.
Indeed, Congress has the final say on what is a question of
87
subject matter jurisdiction. Under Arbaugh v. Y.H. Corp.,
Congress can make any issue one of subject matter jurisdiction
by affirmatively including the issue in the statutory subject
88
matter jurisdiction provisions. Congress thus can legislatively
reverse the presumption articulated in Union Pacific for a
implicitly modified the judicial construction of Section 10(b) as to DOJ and
SEC enforcement actions when it affirmatively introduced statutory indicia of
extraterritoriality. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)
(statutory construction canon against repeal by implication does not apply as
strongly where the "repeal" simply involves a judicial construction of a
statute). This approach involves using a 2010 statute to shape judicial
construction of a statute enacted in 1934, an exercise that some courts may
not be willing to undertake. Nonetheless, some courts may hold that the DoddFrank provisions for SEC and DOJ actions implicitly repeal Morrison’s judicial
interpretation of 10(b) as incorporating a "transaction test."
85. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (recognizing that although the District
Court incorrectly considered the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) to raise a
question of subject-matter jurisdiction, this decision was grounded in “Circuit
precedent.”) (citing Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.)
86. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208; In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
578 F.3d at 1313; Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421.
87. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 500.
88. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516 (noting that Congress has broad
authority to “restrict the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts
based on a wide variety of factors, some of them also relevant to the merits of
a case.”). For example, Congress exercised this power to make an amount-incontroversy threshold an ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction in
delineating diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. at
515.
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particular statute and make the issue one of subject matter
jurisdiction. Congress can also bestow jurisdiction when it
wants to. The Dodd-Frank language apparently was intended
by the SEC, when it was initially drafted, to codify the courts of
appeals approach to extraterritoriality. The statutory language
thus arguably works because it does two things: it turns the
extraterritorial issue into a question of jurisdiction rather than
the merits, and says that SEC and DOJ suits can proceed if
89
brought in certain circumstances because there is jurisdiction.
Under this line of reasoning, the Dodd-Frank provisions
thus reinstate the securities case law that had existed in courts
of appeals—most notably the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
90
Circuits —before both Union Pacific and Morrison were
decided. Union Pacific was not a securities case, but its broad
language as pointed out in Morrison emphasizes that questions
of statutory interpretation pertain to the merits, not to
jurisdiction, unless Congress says otherwise. Now Congress is
saying otherwise. The Dodd-Frank language thus seeks to
restore decades of judicial precedent (none of this precedent
was from the Supreme Court, however, and as pointed out
above was contrary to the Court’s approach to jurisdiction even
91
prior to Union Pacific). This precedent in the courts of appeals
89. In preparing this article, we spoke with the attorneys in the SEC
Office of the General Counsel who, along with the Solicitor General's Office,
drafted the Government's Morrison amicus briefs (both at the certiorari and
merits stage). They explained to us that throughout the legislative process
they were substantially involved in providing technical assistance to members
of Congress that included, among other things, explaining the provisions'
intended effect of codifying the courts of appeals' approach to
extraterritoriality with respect to SEC and DOJ enforcement actions.
90. See, e.g., SEC v. Kaiser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977); Continental
Grain, 592 F.2d at 421; Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 290–91 (9th
Cir. 1996).
91. The federal courts over the years have been less than clear in
explaining that extraterritoriality is not a question of subject matter
jurisdiction. For example, in Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511–13, the Supreme Court
pointed to one of its own decisions, E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244 (1991), in which it had characterized the extraterritorial effect of
Title VII as jurisdictional, as an example of a decision in which it had been
"less than meticulous" in distinguishing between subject matter jurisdiction
and an ingredient of a claim for relief. See, e.g., Litecubes, LLC v. Northern
Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("There is no indication
that Congress intended the extraterritorial limitations on the scope of the
Copyright Act to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.").
Given the confusion created by the courts themselves, it could be seen as
disrespectful of a coordinate branch of government for the courts—the district
courts and courts of appeals in particular—to hold Congress to a higher
standard of precision in its own drafting on the same issue when the intent of
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held that extraterritoriality was a jurisdictional question and
that certain suits could proceed because there was jurisdiction.
92
Now, the SEC, in proposing the Dodd-Frank language, is
asking Congress to put this issue in the jurisdictional box
where the courts of appeals had placed it, and to confer
jurisdiction. Admittedly, nowhere in the legislative history is
there a statement that the SEC or Congress wanted this to be a
jurisdictional issue instead of an issue of the merits in SEC and
DOJ suits. The SEC, however, has favored the way
93
extraterritoriality was analyzed in the courts of appeals. Even
if, in the Morrison briefs, the SEC recognized that under
Supreme Court precedent extraterritoriality was not a question
of subject matter jurisdiction, the SEC still apparently wanted
Congress to reinstate the approach of the courts of appeals in
SEC and DOJ suits and drafted language that it believed did
precisely that. Treating extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional
question was part of this approach. Whether or not the DoddFrank language in fact works in this way (which would
legislatively overrule Part II of the Morrison opinion along with
the rest of that opinion) in SEC and DOJ suits, it was
apparently intended to do so when it was drafted and sent to
Congress by the SEC.
Third, the Supreme Court in Morrison attached relatively
little importance to the difference between jurisdictional
questions and questions on the merits when it decided the
question on the merits, even though the question had been
presented to the Court as one of jurisdiction. The Court did
this even though the Petitioners asked the Court not to decide
the case, but instead to remand to the Second Circuit in light of
94
Union Pacific. Part II of the Morrison opinion points out that
95
the two questions are not the same, but for purposes of this
Congress to allow certain SEC and DOJ actions is clear.
92. It is clear from the briefs in Morrison that the SEC as well as the
parties to the case recognized that the Court saw the issue before it as being
one of the merits, not jurisdiction. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Ltd., Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
2010 WL 719337, at *6 (Feb. 26, 2010).
93. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869, at 6
(No. 08-1191) (arguing that the “Courts of Appeals have consistently and
correctly held that section 10(b) reaches at least some transnational
fraudulent schemes that cause injury outside the United States.”).
94. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
95. See id. (stating that to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what
conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter
jurisdiction, by contrast, “refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”).
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case, it seemingly did not make much difference. The Court
went ahead and decided the case anyway. Would the same
Court later turn around and say that the same distinction—
between jurisdiction and the merits—is so important that
Congress only addressed jurisdiction when it actually meant to
address the merits?
Finally, even if the SEC were to lose a case it brought
under Section 10(b) because a court found the Dodd-Frank
language insufficient to change the substantive reach of the
statute, the SEC could argue that because the language in
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act is broader, and because
Section 17(a) has not yet been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to preclude extraterritorial reach, courts should not now
interpret Section 17(a) to preclude extraterritorial reach. In
particular, the SEC could argue that the Dodd-Frank Act
reveals Congress’s intent with respect to the reach of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, and that the courts should not
subsequently interpret the statute in a manner contrary to that
intent when they have not done so before. This argument might
hold some sway, although the SEC would have to contend with
the fact that the Morrison opinion is full of references to the
Securities Act as well as the Exchange Act, and it is clear under
Morrison that the presumption against extraterritoriality
96
applies to both statutes. Admittedly this is dicta insofar as it
applies to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, but very strong
dicta expressed by the Court before enactment of the DoddFrank provisions on SEC and DOJ actions under Section
97
17(a).
Admittedly, none of these arguments fully addresses the
problem pointed out by Conway, that the Dodd-Frank provision
nowhere addresses the substantive reach of the securities
98
statutes. The provisions merely speak of jurisdiction after the
Supreme Court had expressly said there was jurisdiction, that
jurisdiction was not the issue, and that there was no case on
the merits. The legislative language was not changed after
Union Pacific. Union Pacific, furthermore, was not a significant
change to the Supreme Court’s earlier approach to jurisdiction.
The Dodd-Frank language passed through the House at a time
when the drafters knew there was jurisdiction and that the
question before the Court in Morrison was the merits. The
96. See id. at 2877, 2885.
97. See id.
98. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz, supra note 10.
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statute still does not directly address the merits. Collectively,
the above arguments tilt the scales in favor of the SEC, but the
situation Congress has left for the SEC and the courts is not a
good one.
V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, it is doubtful that many courts will flout the will of
Congress and decide against the SEC on this issue, particularly
in view of the circumstances in which Congress enacted these
provisions. Although the statutory language had been drafted
in anticipation of the Court’s holding in Morrison, it was not
known that it would go in the statute until Morrison was
actually decided. The final full day of the Dodd-Frank HouseSenate conference was the day the Supreme Court decided
Morrison, giving the conferees limited time to react. It was
later that morning that the Senate side of the conference
committee adopted the SEC/DOJ provisions, and that evening
that Congressman Kanjorski proposed the private study of
99
Under these circumstances,
private rights of actions.
Congress’s intent to override Morrison in SEC and DOJ actions
(even if less than artfully worded) is clear and is likely to carry
substantial weight.
This is, however, legislative language that Congress did
not change or explain despite months of notice that
extraterritoriality was seen by the Supreme Court as a
question of the merits rather than jurisdiction. Congress should
do the right thing and enact a legislative fix before the
government and private parties are burdened by litigation on
this issue. Congress should make the statutory language in the
Dodd-Frank Act say what it meant to say.

99. See H.R. Res. 3817, 111th Cong. (2009).

